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Abstract 
 
We analyse the determinants of union membership in the UK using data from the BHPS (1991-2003). 
Employing three alternative methodologies to control for the problem of initial conditions we find that union 
membership remains persistent even after controlling for the unobserved effect. There is evidence of a 
considerable correlation between the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the initial membership 
status. Ignoring this overstates the degree of state dependence of union membership greatly. The extent 
of state dependence in union membership status is notably higher in the (1991-1996) period estimates and 
appears to be more pronounced in the case of male employees for the entire period under analysis. The 
second period estimates reveal that unobserved heterogeneity has a more prominent impact in 
determining future unionisation probability versus past union membership. Finally, the estimates suggest 
that an individual´s propensity to unionise is determined by a mixture of industrial and personal 
characteristics. This is at odds with earlier studies, such as Booth (1986) and Wright (1995), failing to 
control for unobservable effects and concluding that personal attributes do not have a significant impact on 
unionisation propensity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyses the determinants of union membership in the U.K during
1991-2003. We are interested in investigating the characteristics of the individuals
who join trade unions and identify the traits that are associated with higher, as
well as, lower unionisation propensity.
Further, we wish to explore whether both personal and industrial characteris-
tics are equally important determinants of individual unionisation propensity. In
addition, we aim to establish if union membership is still persistent in an era that
is characterised by rapid deunionisation. In other words, we seek to determine
whether individuals who have been union members is the past are likely to do so
in the future and if the present disadvantageous position of unions in the UK is
coupled with a fall in union persistence.
Unobserved individual heterogeneity (i.e. the unobserved individual charac-
teristics underlying the union/non-union decision) and actual experience of union
membership in the past, o¤er opposing justications to the likelihood that indi-
viduals might remain in unions in the future (see Hsiao, 2003). Thus, we need to
determine the relative importance of unobserved heterogeneity versus past experi-
ence of unionisation in determining future union status.
Provided that the initial value of union status is a¤ected by past experience
we need to employ an estimation methodology that accounts for the initial condi-
tions problem. Primarily since the random e¤ects maximum likelihood estimator
in its standard form will be inconsistent (see Heckman, 1981a,b) and furthermore,
because the correlation between unobservable e¤ects and the initial value of union
status will overstate the degree of state dependence. We employ three alternative
methods, namely, Heckman (1981b), Orme (2001), Wooldridge (2005) to account
for initial conditions and obtain the degree of true, as opposed to spurious, state
dependence in union membership. Therefore, our nal research task is assessing
the relative merits and comparing the results obtained from these alternative esti-
mators.
The legal framework governing collective bargaining arrangements in the United
Kingdom was substantially altered during the 1980s. Stewart (1995) provides a
concise account of the successive legislative changes that were targeted towards
weakening the bargaining strength of UK trade unions.
The introduction of the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts strengthened the case
for claiming unfair dismissal on the basis of an employees refusal to enter a closed
shop. The 1982 Act dictated that all post-entry closed shops had to be sanctioned
via a ballot of the workforce. The successive 1988 and 1990 Employment Acts
prohibited all means to enforce a closed shop and thus, rendered post-entry and
pre-entry closed shops, respectively, illegal. The overall e¤ect was that the 1980s
was a decade of a dramatic decline in aggregate trade union membership and union
recognition in the UK (Stewart, 1995, pp.143-145).
Changes in the pattern of trade union membership and union recognition in
the UK have been studied by a number of authors (e.g. Booth, 1986; Gregg and
Naylor, 1993; Andrews and Naylor, 1994; Wright, 1995; Disney et al, 1996; Disney
et al, 1999). Most of these studies employ cross-sectional data and are, therefore
unable to control for unobservable individual-specic e¤ects something that might
well result in biased estimates of the e¤ect of observable attributes. Further, upon
failing to let the e¤ects of the explanatory variables be time dependent the e¤ects
of establishment characteristics are particularly prone to bias (see Arulampalam
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and Booth, 2000, p.290).
Arulampalam and Booth (2000) using data from the National Child Develop-
ment Study was the rst longitudinal study of the patterns of changes in individual
membership across time for a single cohort of individuals (young men) in the UK.
However, the nature of their data set does not allow them to discriminate between
calendar time and life-cycle e¤ects.
Costs and benets of potential union membership are quite hard to quantify and
the relevant data are not always available. Individuals might opt to become trade
union members so as to benet from incentive private excludable goods available
only to trade union members. Arulampalam and Booth (2000) summarise these
as protection against unfair dismissal, discrimination due to ethnic minority group
membership, grievance procedures, pension plans advice and the implementation
of well-dened dismissal arrangements in recessionary periods (p.291). Naylor and
Raaum (1993) note that trade union membership can be "inuenced by both social
custom e¤ects and by resources devoted by management to opposing unionisation"
(p.591). Farber (1983) emphasises that "workers are heterogeneous in their prefer-
ence for union representation to the extent that workers of di¤erent characteristics
derive di¤erent amounts of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benets from unionisa-
tion" (p.1420).
Conclusively then, unobserved individual heterogeneity plays an important role
in modelling union membership status and failing to control for this provides biased
estimates. However, it should be remembered that the existing data restrictions,
and in particular the paucity of employer controls, mean that we cannot attribute
any specic e¤ects entirely to unobserved heterogeneity.
Our ndings provide evidence that union membership remains persistent even
after controlling for the unobserved e¤ect. The likelihood to remain in unions
having experienced unionisation in the past has, however, fallen during the period
under analysis. Further, failing to control for unobserved individual-specic e¤ects
overstates the true degree of union membership persistence and indicates the in-
appropriateness of the pooled Probit estimator that assumes away any correlation
between the successive disturbances. We conclude that the relative importance of
unobserved heterogeneity in determining future unionisation propensity rises during
the second period as opposed to the e¤ect of past union membership.
Heckmans (1981b) solution to the initial conditions problem is our preferred
estimator on the grounds that it incorporates pre-sample information, whereas,
Wooldridges (2005) methodology is attractive due to its computational simplicity.
Ormes (2001) method is found to be fairly restrictive as the assumption of a suf-
ciently low correlation among the initial condition and the unobserved e¤ect is
rejected by the data thus rendering the resulting estimates inconsistent.
Lastly, but not least, contrary to earlier studies failing to control for unob-
servables, we nd that both industrial and personal characteristics are important
factors in the union/non-union decision. The most prominent observed heterogene-
ity e¤ect, other than lagged union status, on the probability of unionisation comes
from the size of workforce that it is positively associated with union membership.
Furthermore, with respect to both genders during the entire period under analy-
sis, highly qualied individuals appear to be less prone to unionisation. However,
employees in the public and education sectors seem to have a higher propensity
towards unions.
Concerning the male estimates there is evidence of a widespread decline in the
probability of union membership across the majority of occupations during the
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rst period and further, the second period results reveal a prevalent deunionisation
tendency across all industries except the public and education sectors. The female
estimates on the other hand, display no evidence of prevailing deunionisation across
any occupation. This occurs in that, contrary to the male samples, female union
membership rates have been increasing during the period under analysis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines data and
sample selection issues; Section 3 the estimation methodology; Section 4 presents
and explores the estimated results; and Section 5 concludes.
2. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) originated in 1991 and follows the
same representative sample of individuals over a number of time periods. The rst
wave of the Panel (1991-92) consisted of 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals
drawn from 250 regions of Great Britain. In 1999 further samples of 1,500 house-
holds in the cases of both Scotland and Wales were added and in 2001 a sample of
2,000 households from Northern Ireland was included in the survey.
The data were split into two balanced panels (1991-1996 and 1997-2002) com-
prising of employees aged between sixteen and sixty ve, excluding full-time stu-
dents, that have participated in all of the respective six waves of the survey.3 The
ECHP4 samples and the new Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland samples were
selected out.
The traditional practice in union literature is to use male manual full-time
employees in order to estimate the determinants of union membership (see Swa¢ eld,
2000, p.439). However, this study uses a full- time male employeessample and a full
sample of female employees (full-time and part-time inclusive of female employees
on maternity leave).
Part-time male employees were excluded from the male regression sample used in
this study in that the small gains in terms of sample size are more than outweighted
by the costs of a potential increase in the heterogeneity of the male regression
samples.
In addition, the full female sample can provide a comparison group against the
male full-time employee sample that could potentially su¤er from selectivity bias.
According to Swa¢ eld (2001) it might be possible, however, that the female sample
is also prone to sample selection bias caused by the labour market participation
decision (p.439).
Further disaggregation towards a male manual full-time sample was not per-
formed however as it would be fairly costly in terms of sample sizes. Descriptive
statistics Tables for the respective selected samples are provided in Table 1 in the
Appendix and include of a set of personal and industrial characteristics.
2.1. Trade Union Membership
The dependent variable is an indicator function taking a value of one if an
individual is a trade union member and a value of zero otherwise. An individual
is taken to be a trade union member if he or she has responded positively to the
question "Are you currently a member of: Trade Unions" in the Social and Interest
3Proxy respondents allocated zero weights by the data depositors, by default, were selected
out.
4European Community Household Panel survey.
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Group Membership section of the BHPS. The respective variable in the BHPS data
set is "Member of trade union". Unfortunately, this question was only asked every
other year after the fth wave (1995-96) of the survey since, the data depositors
believe that there is not a lot of movement in and out of organisations and therefore,
it was not felt necessary to ask this every year.
A further union membership variable which is available in the BHPS, "Member
of workplace union", can be used as a proxy for union membership for waves six
(1996-97), eight (1998-99), ten (2000-01) and twelve (2002-03). This variable is
derived through the question that was asked conditionally following a positive
response to the question "Is there a trade union, or a similar body such as a sta¤
association, recognised by your management for negotiating pay or conditions for
the people doing your sort of job in your workplace?".5
Following this response, a positive reply to "Are you a member of this trade
union/association?" is recorded as membership of workplace union which includes
"in-house" sta¤ associations, but excludes employers organisations. This intro-
duces a degree of discontinuity in the BHPS data regarding trade union member-
ship as this broader denition is also inclusive of sta¤ associations, but, nevertheless
when one wishes to undertake a longitudinal analysis spanning all of the rst and
last six waves of the BHPS this is the only alternative available.6
The "Union or sta¤ association at workplace" variable allows us to construct
a measure of union coverage. However, the fact that an individuals workplace is
covered by a trade union that is recognised by management for bargaining purposes
does not necessarily imply that this particular individual will actually be a member
of the union.
According to Andrews et al (1998) while at the individual level members and
non-members doing the same job within the same establishment earn the same
wage, when comparing across establishments trade union membership is "a closer
indicator of a di¤erential than coverage"(p.453).
Thus, to conclude this Section. The cross-sectional time-series trade union mem-
bership variable constructed for all twelve waves of the survey su¤ers from a certain
degree of discontinuity. Nevertheless, the two alternative questions available in the
BHPS make it feasible to construct a measure of union membership. The individ-
ual responses from the two alternative union membership questions and the union
coverage outcomes can be compared in order to detect any potential measurement
error in union membership responses (see Swa¢ eld, 2001). However, this is beyond
the scope of this paper.
The descriptive statistics (in Table 1) reveal that male union membership dur-
ing (1997-2002) has fallen by approximately 15.3 percent compared to the (1991-
1996) levels. The respective female union membership rate has actually risen by
approximately 9.5 percent so that by the last cross-section of the survey female
unionisation rates converged to the level of male unionisation rates at a marginally
higher percentage.
3. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
The dynamic model depicting the decision of an individual to join either the
unionised or non-unionised sector is outlined in equation (1) below. The benets
5The resulting variable is termed as "Union or sta¤ association at workplace".
6Swa¢ ed (2001) employs a similar approach.
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of employment within the unionised sector are captured by the latent variable yit.
The union membership status of an individual i in period t, is indicated by the
dummy variable yit.
The unknown parameters to be estimated are (; )0 and xit is a vector of ex-
ogenous explanatory variables (personal and industrial characteristics). The com-
posite error term it captures the unobserved individual heterogeneity underlying
the union membership decision and is decomposed into an individual-specic com-
ponent "i and an individual time-specic e¤ect uit:
yit = x
0
it + yi;t 1 + it (1)
yit = I(y

it i 0)
it = "i + uit; t = 1; :::; T ; i = 1; :::; N
3.1. Potential Limitations
The combined e¤ect of the 1988 and 1990 Employment Acts, that precede the
introduction of the BHPS in 1991, was the e¤ective outlaw of both post-entry and
pre-entry closed shops (see Stewart, 1995). This has the implication that individuals
undertake their unionisation decision on the basis of wages, individual preferences
and non-pecuniary benets without coercion.
Potential seniority and non-pecuniary benets can be su¢ ciently strong motives
for individuals to remain within the unionised sector, irrespective of wage changes,
and this introduces state dependence in the model (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998).
The obvious drawback, however, of adding the lagged union membership variable as
a regressor is that it gives rise to the problem of initial conditions which is discussed
in greater detail in Section 3.2.
Of course, becoming a union member is also conditional upon the employers
hiring decision (see Abowd and Farber, 1982) and the primary deciency of the
union membership model employed is that it ignores the role of the employer in
determining union status. Despite the fact that employer attributes are captured
through the industrial classication dummies and the establishment size controls
these are not adequate in order to assign any specic e¤ects purely to unobserved
heterogeneity (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998, p.164). Further, as has been already
mentioned in the previous Section, the BHPS limits our ability to control for po-
tential establishment age e¤ects on union membership.7
Another potential shortcoming of the model concerns free riding on union bar-
gained wages that apply to all employees within a covered establishment irrespective
of their union membership status. Booth (1986) argues that wages can be viewed as
a collective good by the individual therefore casting doubts on whether wages can
actually be considered as a determinant of an individuals unionisation probability.
The collective good argument does not invalidate the theoretical prediction that
union density is potentially positively associated with higher union wages. At
the margin an individuals union membership decision might not be a¤ected by
the level of wages set by collective bargaining. Primarily, this occurs because the
individual does not consider that his decision will make an important di¤erence to
the aggregate union density in his sector. What is more, the "marginal" individual
can always free-ride (see Booth, 1986, p.44 and pp.58-59).
Some readers might consider the exclusion of wages from the sectoral choice
model of union membership as inappropriate. Wages can be included in the union
7Via the establishment "age e¤ect" impact on union recognition (see Stewart, 1995).
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membership models to detect whether individuals do free-ride and an insignicant
coe¢ cient can then validate the public goods theory of union wages given that
earnings are not proxying any omitted variables. However, according to Booth
(1986) this scenario is highly unlikely (p.44).
Vella and Verbeek (1998) suggest that the lagged value of union membership
status a¤ects an individualsunionisation decision while it does not have any sig-
nicant e¤ect on the current wage. It is argued that union membership status
may capture movement costs that are not specic to union employment. Work-
ers are therefore assumed to change union membership status only if they change
jobs. Furthermore, the long-term advantages of union employment, whilst generat-
ing persistence of union membership status are not expected to have a signicant
impact on wages and therefore lagged union membership status is expected to have
a minor e¤ect on current wages (p.167).
The joint determination of union status and wages renders the coe¢ cients of
a single equation model inclusive of wages biased and inconsistent. Even if wages
and union status are not determined simultaneously, which is rather improbable,
wages might be acting as a proxy for omitted variables that are simultaneous such
as job security and pension provisions and this would produce biased results. Since
wages can be either a complement or a substitute of union negotiated non-pecuniary
benets the direction of the bias cannot be determined a priori, thus rendering the
interpretation of the resulting coe¢ cients on wages problematic (Booth, 1986, p.43).
A two-step methodology such as the one o¤ered by Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999b)
provides a far more attractive alternative and this paper focuses on the rst stage
estimation of reduced form models of union membership determination.
3.2. Estimation Procedure and the Problem of Initial Conditions
Modelling any stochastic process with structural dependence among time-ordered
outcomes requires initialising the process (Heckman, 1981a, p.118). Initial condi-
tions do become irrelevant asymptotically as T gets innitely large although, in the
case of short panels as is the case in this study the problem cannot be overlooked
since T = 6 and asymptotics instead rely on large sample sizes, N . The initial
conditions problem occurs when the initial value of the dependent variable is corre-
lated with unobserved individual heterogeneity. The presence of individual-specic
e¤ects "i clearly invalidates the assumption of exogeneity of union membership
status in the rst period of the survey.
The initiation of the stochastic process determining union membership has been
in operation prior to initiation of the BHPS in 1991. This occurs since a large
fraction of individuals in the samples used were labour market participants before
1991. Thus, the initial value of union membership cannot be taken to be exogenous.
The conditional probability that an individual will become a union member in the
future is a function of past experience.
The initial conditions problem cannot be readily ignored since the random ef-
fects maximum likelihood estimator in its standard form will be inconsistent (see
Heckman, 1981a,b). Further, ignoring the correlation between individual-specic
e¤ects "i and the initial conditions will overstate the degree of state dependence.
State dependence and individual heterogeneity o¤er "diametrically opposite"
explanations of the notion that those individuals who have experienced an event in
the past are more likely to do so in the future (Hsiao, 2003, p.216).
Considering otherwise identical individuals it is possible that those who have
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experienced unionisation in the past will amend their preferences determining future
propensity to unionise (e.g. via potential seniority and non-pecuniary benets
pertaining to union membership). This is an entirely behavioural e¤ect.
Alternatively, it is possible individuals di¤er in specic unmeasured variables
that a¤ect their propensity to unionise while they are not inuenced by experienc-
ing unionisation per se. In the event whereby such variables are correlated over
time, and are not appropriately controlled for, past experience may turn out to
be a determinant of the individualsfuture propensity to unionise since it acts as
proxy for the temporally persistent unobservables. This is what Heckman (1981a,
1981b) terms as "spurious state dependence" as opposed to "true (structural) state
dependence" occurring in the former scenario.
Union membership decision is modelled using the dynamic Random e¤ects Pro-
bit specication given in equation (2). The random e¤ects formulation was chosen
since in the case of dynamic models with large N and small T xed e¤ects pro-
duce inconsistent estimates of the parameters as di¤erencing out "i generates a
linear regression model with lagged dependent regressors and serially correlated
disturbances. Further, the Random e¤ects Probit model is used instead of its Logit
counterpart since random e¤ects yield correlations among the successive distur-
bances. For this purpose, the multivariate normal distribution is more exible than
the corresponding logistic distribution which requires that all correlations are equal
to 0.5 (see Maddala, 1987):
yit = x
0
it + yi;t 1 + "i + uit; uit  N(0; 2u) (2)
The random e¤ects model in its standard form assumes that "i is not correlated
with xit. The presence of the individual-specic time-invariant e¤ect "i, however,
renders the composite error term vit = "i + uit temporally correlated even when
the uit are taken to be serially independent. Adopting the Mundlak (1978)- Cham-
berlain (1984) specication we can allow for a correlation between "i and the time
means of the observed time-varying characteristics taking the form of "i = x0ia+i.
Substituting this expression for "i in equation (2) we arrive at specication (3)
where it is assumed that i  iidN(0; 2) and is independent of (xit; uit) for all i
and t:
yit = x
0
it + yi;t 1 + x
0
ia+ i + uit; uit  N(0; 2u) (3)
The individual-specic random e¤ects framework suggests an equi-correlation,
, between any two successive disturbances for the same individual unit. Given
that yit is dichotomous, a normalisation is necessary and it is commonly assumed
that 2u = 1. The resulting expression for  is given in equation (4):
 = cor(vit; vis) =
2
2 + 1
; t; s = 2; :::; T ; t 6= s (4)
The initial conditions problem is tackled using three alternative estimation
methodologies suggested by Heckman (1981b), Orme (2001) andWooldridge (2005).
Heckmans solution to the initial conditions problem approximates the reduced
form marginal probability of the initial state by a Probit function which has as its
argument all of the available pre-sample information on the exogenous variables
(Heckman, 1981b, p.188). Orme (2001) suggests a two step methodology which
is an approximation if the correlation between the initial condition and individual
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random e¤ects is weak. Wooldridge (2005) proposes an alternative approach which
involves modelling the distribution of the unobserved e¤ect conditional on the initial
value and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables (p.40).
3.2.1. Heckmans Estimator
Stewart (2006) provides a Stata command, -redprob-, for Heckmans estimator
of the dynamic Random e¤ects Probit model. In the spirit of Heckman (1981b)
we specify a linearised reduced form for the initial observation given by equation
(5) where zi1 denotes a vector of strictly exogenous instruments such as pre-sample
information8 a¤ecting an individuals propensity to unionise, the vector of means
xi and xi1, i is correlated with i but not with uit for t  2:
yi1 = z
0
i1 + i (5)
In terms of orthogonal error components i can be expressed as:
i = i + ui1;   0 (6)
By construction (i; ui1) in equation (6) are independent of one another. Exo-
geneity of the initial conditions occurs when  = 0. Further, it is assumed that ui1
meets the same distributional assumptions as uit for t  2. The linearised reduced
form for sectoral choice in the initial time period is given by:
yi1 = z
0
i1 + i + ui1; t = 1; i = 1; :::; N (7)
The joint probability of (yi1; :::; yiT ) for individual i, given i, suggested by
Heckmans methodology is shown in (8) where  is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function:
[(z0i1 + i)(2yi1   1)]:
T

t=2
[(x0it + yi;t 1 + x
0
ia+ i)(2yi1   1)] (8)
Thus, expression (9) denotes the likelihood function to be maximised for a
random sample of individuals. F stands for the distribution function of  = =
and given the normalisation adopted  =
p
=1  . Stewart (2006) provides
a program for this maximum likelihood estimator whereby, assuming that  is
normally distributed, the integral over  is evaluated using the Gaussian-Hermite
quadrature:

i
Z

f[(z0i1+)(2yi1 1)]:
T

t=2
[(x0it+yi;t 1+x
0
ia+
)(2yi1 1)]gdF ()
(9)
8The "year current labour force status began" variable in the BHPS allows us to obtain infor-
mation about the industrial/occupational classication for those individuals that have entered the
labour force prior to 1991 and 1997 in the two panels. Further pre-sample information variables
were constructed for the highest educational qualication of those individuals aged over 25 at the
initiation of the respective panels.
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3.2.2. Ormes Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Orme (2001) o¤ers a "pseudo maximum likelihood estimator" PMLE procedure
that recties the standard MLE for the e¤ect of previous event history. The linear
specication in terms of orthogonal disturbances in equation (6) allows for the
possibility of non-zero correlation r = corr(ai; i). Ormes two-step methodology
is an approximation when r is local to zero (i.e. when the correlation between the
initial condition and the random e¤ect is small).
Following Arulampalam et al (2000) we start with equation (3). Equation (6)
is redened as i = i + wi where by construction (i; wi) are orthogonal of one
another,  = r= and var(wi) = 2(1  r2). Substituting this new specication
for the random e¤ect into equation (3) we arrive at:
yit = x
0
it + yi;t 1 + x
0
ia+ i + wi + uit (10)
We begin with the linearised reduced form for the initial observation equation
(5). Assuming that (i; i) are bivariate normal then E(wi j yi1) = 0 and E(i j
yi1) = ei where:
ei =
(2yi1   1)'(z0i1)
(f2yi1   1gz0i1)
(11)
is the generalised Probit residual (see Gourieroux et al, 1987) obtained from equa-
tion (5). Assuming that uit is independent of xit we take wi to be the typical
Random e¤ects Probit error component given that we replace i by its conditional
expectation.
The assumption of bivariate normality of (i; i) renders the error component wi
in the second stage Random e¤ects Probit model in equation (10) heteroskedastic
since:
var(wi j yi1) = 2(1  r22i ); i =
'(z0i1)p
(z0i1)( z0i1)
(12)
E¤ectively then, Ormes two stage methodology involves estimating an "arti-
cial" Random e¤ects Probit model which is augmented by the generalised Probit
residual obtained from the rst stage linearised reduced form for the initial period
equation (5) under appropriate normality assumptions.
The rationalisation of Ormes approach is grounded on the assumption of r being
local to zero so that var(wi j yi1) = 2. Note that since union membership is a
dichotomous variable the Probit model for the initial period needs the normalisation
that  = 1. Given the expression for  in equation (10) we obtain r = =.
Rearranging equation (4) we arrive at 2 = =(1   ) and hence, an estimate
of r can be obtained by the expression provided in equation (13) where  is the
coe¢ cient on the generalised Probit residual from equation (10):
r = 
p
(1  )= (13)
The "pseudo log-likelihood" to be maximised includes lagged union membership
but treats yi1 as exogenous. Augmenting the set of regressors by ei "provides a
test of, and an approximate control for, the initial conditions problem". Locally
equivalent alternative methodology guarantees that the usual t-test of the coe¢ cient
of the generalised residual gives an asymptotically valid test of r = 0 (Orme, 2001,
p.6).
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3.2.3. Wooldridges Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Wooldridges (2005) solution to the initial conditions problem species a distri-
bution of unobserved individual heterogeneity conditional on the initial condition
instead of obtaining the joint distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous vari-
ables.
We begin by specifying the distribution of the unobserved e¤ect as:
"ijyi1; xi  N(0 + 1yi1 + x0i2; 2); xi = fxi1; :::; xiT g (14)
where the (1xT ) row vector xi contains all non-redundant explanatory variables in
all periods under consideration.
The presence of xi in expression (14) implies that we are not able to identify
the coe¢ cients on time-constant explanatory variables in xit although time-constant
explanatory variables can be included in xi and this is the main disadvantage of
Wooldridges approach. Including time-constant explanatory variables in xit will
only increase the explanatory power of the model as it is not possible to separately
identify the partial e¤ect of time-constant variables from their partial correlation
with the unobserved e¤ect (Wooldridge, 2005, p.44).
Of course, the implication of adopting the Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984)
device allowing for a correlation between "i and the time means of the observed
time varying characteristics, "i = x0ia + i, with the Heckman (1981b) and Orme
(2001) approaches is that the presence of the xi means that we cannot separately
identify the e¤ects of time-constant variables there, either.
The density D(yi1; :::; yiT jyi1 = y1; xi = x; i = ) is given by:
T

t=1
f(x0t+yt 1+0+1yi1+x02+)yt :[1 (x0t+yt 1+0+1yi1+x02+)]1 ytg
(15)
To nd the joint distribution of (yi2; :::; yiT j yi1 = y1; xi = x) we need to in-
tegrate out i. Integrating (15) against the Normal (0; 2) gives the likelihood
function in expression (16) which is identical to the structure of the standard Ran-
dom e¤ects Probit model with the only di¤erence that the explanatory variables at
time t are fzit  (1; xit; yi;t 1; yi1; xi)g. It is assumed that data are observed for
each cross-sectional unit in all time periods although given specic sample selection
mechanisms (16) can be employed for the subset of observations forming a balanced
panel:
Z
R
T

t=1
f(x0t + yt 1 + 0 + 1yi1 + x02 + )yt : (16)
[1  (x0t + yt 1 + 0 + 1yi1 + x02 + )]1 ytg(1=)(=)d
Essentially then, what Wooldridge (2005) suggests is that by adding yi1 and xi as
additional explanatory variables in each time period under consideration and using
a computationally easy standard Random e¤ects Probit software we can estimate
(; ; 0; 1; 2; 
2
).
To sum up, the three alternative methodologies can be employed to test whether
the initial value of union status is exogenous. If our expectation that the initial con-
ditions are endogenous is veried then the three estimators can provide consistent
results. Finally, controlling for the correlation between unobservable e¤ects and the
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initial condition will provide the degree of true as opposed to spurious state depen-
dence in union membership. Orme (2001) and Wooldridge (2005) provide simpler
solutions to the initial conditions problem that are computationally less demanding
to Heckmans (1981b) estimator. The estimates and relative performance of the
three solutions are discussed in the following Section.
4. ESTIMATES
We focus on the estimates obtained using the Heckman (1981b) and Wooldridge
(2005) estimation methodologies. Concerning Ormes (2001) two-step methodology,
the estimates of the correlation between the initial condition and the random ef-
fect, r, were all in excess of 0:8. In the light of this, we cannot ignore the inherent
heteroskedasticity of the residual component, wi, in the second stage Random ef-
fects Probit model (eq:10) as it produces inconsistent parameter estimates. The
estimated results are therefore, not reported here.
The requirement that r is local to zero under Ormes (2001) estimator is quite
a stringent condition. Arulampalam et al (2000) looking at unemployment per-
sistence obtain signicantly lower values of r. We would normally expect union
membership to be far more persistent than unemployment, in that the former en-
tails long term benets whereas long term unemployment reduces the employment
probability of an individual. Therefore, the high correlation between the initial
value of union status and the random e¤ect found here is not surprising.
The remaining estimated models of union membership employing Heckmans
(1981b) and Wooldridges (2005) estimators are provided in Tables (2-5) in the
Appendix. In all reported models the null under the Wald statistic9 for multi-
ple exclusion restrictions is rejected and hence, all inclusive covariates are jointly
statistically signicant. Further, the estimated parameters generally possess the
theoretically predicted coe¢ cients.
The reported Random e¤ects Probit estimates were arrived at employing the
adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature method to compute the log likelihood and its
derivatives since the large group sizes and the sizeable within group correlations,
, in all of the estimated models made the non-adaptive quadrature approximation
inaccurate. The models were estimated by increasing the number of quadrature
points to 30 which is equivalent to increasing the degree of the polynomial approx-
imation (see Butler and Mo¢ tt, 1982).10
The major advantage of Wooldridges estimator is its computational simplicity
which reduces estimation time substantially compared to Stewarts (2006) com-
mand used to implement Heckmans estimator. Wooldridges estimator for t > 1
was extended by a standard Probit estimator for t = 1 to enable comparability with
Heckmans estimator, although the latter still produced a superior log-likelihood
for all models. This occurs in that Wooldridges estimator fails to incorporate
pre-sample information on the basis of which Heckmans solution to the initial con-
ditions problem is our preferred estimation methodology. However, the estimates
obtained using both approaches are reported here as this reinforces the argument
that the correlation between the initial condition and the unobserved heterogeneity
9LR for the pooled Probit estimates.
10The quadrature checks undertaken revealed that the coe¢ cient estimates were nearly invariant
to the quadrature point variation. The polynomial approximation with 30 quadtrature points is
therefore su¢ ciently accurate and the estimated results can be interpreted with condence.
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results in an over-statement of the extent of state dependence in union membership,
more e¤ectively.
Stewarts -redpprob- command reports a pooled Probit model for t > 1, the
estimates of the reduced form model for the initial observation11 and the dynamic
Random e¤ects Probit estimates12 for t > 1. The pooled Probit estimator treats
the whole sample as a large cross-section therefore assuming away all cross period
correlation. This restrictive Probit estimator provides an initial consistent estimate
of the parameters although it is ine¢ cient (see Maddala, 1987) and the respective
estimates are only provided here to demonstrate the overstatement of the degree
of state dependence. The null hypothesis under the likelihood-ratio test for  was
rejected in each of the estimated Random e¤ects Probit models. This implies that
 6= 0 and thus the successive error components for the same individual unit are
correlated. In the light of this, the reported pooled Probit estimates for t > 1
are rejected in favour of the Random e¤ects Probit estimates. Consequently, we
cannot fail to accommodate the role of unobserved characteristics in modelling the
unionisation decision of individuals.
Regarding both the Heckman and Wooldridge estimators, the proportion of
the total error variation attributed to unobserved individual heterogeneity, , was
signicantly higher in the (1997-2002) dynamic Random e¤ects Probit models for
both genders. Further, the unobserved heterogeneity in the female random e¤ects
estimates generally constitutes a notably greater proportion of the unexplained
variance of the composite error term than it does in the corresponding male esti-
mates.13 This could signal our failure to use a su¢ ciently rich set of explanatory
variables in order to explain the union determinants of a far more heterogeneous
sample that is inclusive of part-time employees which are absent from the male
samples.
The higher intra-panel correlation in the second period estimates suggests that
unobserved attributes, underlying individual unionisation propensity, have a greater
impact in the respective period. Failure to control for the evident correlation among
the unobservables will lead to spurious state depedence (see Heckman, 1981a,b).
Since state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity o¤er opposing rationalisa-
tions of future individual propensity towards unionisation, union persistence should
have a diminishing e¤ect in the second period estimates; this is what we explore in
the following Section.
4.1. The Persistence of Trade Union Membership
Turning to the exogeneity of the initial conditions, in the case of the Heckman
estimator this requires that  = 0. It is evident that exogeneity14 is strongly
rejected in all models with the exception of the male (1991-1996) model where it is
rejected at the not so stringent 10% level of signicance. Hence, the union status
11The estimates of the reduced form model for the initial period are not reported here as they
are not of direct interest.
12The reported Random e¤ects Probit estimates are inclusive of either a set of industrial or
occupational controls as the there is a certain degree of overlapping among the two classications.
Unless one of the two sets of controls was excluded, the maximum likelihood functions using the
-redprob- command would not converge due to this collinearity. The same exclusions were made
in the Wooldridge estimates for comparison purposes.
13Apart from the (1997-2002) Heckman estimator where  was marginally higher in the model
for male employees.
14Testing for  = 0 must take into account that it lies on the boundary of the parameter space
(see Stewart 2006) .
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of employees at the beginning of each time period under analysis is correlated with
unobservable individual-specic characteristics.
With regard to the Wooldridge estimator, the coe¢ cients on the initial value
of union membership enter all of the estimated models with particularly strong
and statistically signicant e¤ects that are much greater in magnitude than the
coe¢ cients on the lagged value of union status. This indicates that there is a
considerable correlation between the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the
initial condition. This correlation becomes even more pronounced in the (1997-
2002) estimates for both genders compared to the respective (1991-1996) estimates
and it is slightly more accentuated in the male models.
The coe¢ cient on the lagged value of trade union membership enters all of the
estimated models with a generally strongly statistically signicant coe¢ cient, an
outcome that indicates that there is positive state dependence in union membership
status even after controlling for the unobserved e¤ect. The prevalent correlation
between the initial condition and the unobserved individual heterogeneity renders
the pooled Probit estimates inconsistent and the consequent over-statement of the
extent of state dependence, across all models, is quite clear.
The pooled Probit and Random e¤ects Probit estimates employ di¤erent nor-
malisations. The former uses 2 = 1 and therefore gives an estimate of =
whereas the latter employing 2u = 1 reports =u. For comparison purposes the
random e¤ects estimates have to be multiplied by the factor
q
1  f = u=  so
that they are converted into = (see Arulampalam, 1999). The rescaled coe¢ -
cients15 on lagged union membership status are reduced even further compared to
the "inated" pooled Probit estimates and in the case of both female (1997-2002)
models they are driven to statistical insignicance.
To obtain the magnitudes of state dependence the average partial, marginal,
e¤ects (
^
pj   ^p0) and predicted probability ratios (
^
pj=
^
p0) were estimated using the
following counter-factual probabilities that take yt 1 to be xed at 0 and 1 and are
evaluated at xit = x (see Wooldridge, 2006; Stewart, 2007):
^
pj =
1
N
NX
i=1
f(x0
^
 + j + x
0
i
^
a)
q
1  fg; ^p0 =
1
N
NX
i=1
f(x0
^
 + x0i
^
a)
q
1  fg (17)
The average partial e¤ects and predicted probability ratios provided at the
bottom of Tables (2-5) in the Appendix are an estimate of state dependence of union
membership. The Heckman and Wooldridge estimators generally produce similar
magnitudes while the respective pooled Probit values are substantially "inated".
The predicted probability ratios in the case of the Heckman and Wooldridge
(1991-1996) estimates suggest that a male worker with a given set of observable
and unobservable attributes is 3.1 and 2.4 times, respectively, as likely to be a
union member at period t if he had been so at t 1. The corresponding probability
ratios from the (1997-2002) estimates are 1.3 and 1.6.
A female worker possessing a given set of observable and unobservable charac-
teristics is approximately 2 and 1.7 times as likely to be a union member at period
t if she had been so at t  1 according to the respective predicted probability ratios
15{1.249, 0.988; 0.256, 0.326} for the (1991-1996; 1997-2002) male models for the Heckman and
Wooldridge estimators respectively. Similarly, the corresponding values in the female models are
{0.663,0.625; 0.090,0.151}.
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from the Heckman and Wooldridge (1991-1996) estimates. Similarly, the respective
ratios from the (1997-2002) estimates suggest that a female worker is 1.1 and 1.2
times as likely to remain a union member.
Conclusively then, the extent of state dependence in union membership status
is markedly higher in the (1991-1996) estimates as opposed to the (1997-2002)
estimates concerning both genders. This outcome implies that for British employees
during the period under analysis the probability of remaining a union member has
declined. This is in line with our expectations following the introduction of the
successive (1980, 1982, 1988, 1990) Employment Acts. The resulting reduction in
UK trade union bargaining strength has e¤ectively redened British labour relations
by taking away power from unions and "transferring it" to management.
Further, the degree of state dependence in male union membership appears to
be more pronounced than the respective female dependence in both time periods
under consideration. This is not surprising as the male samples employed consist
solely of full-time employees and moreover, male labour market participation is not
as discontinuous as it is for female employees.
The prevalent correlation among the initial value of union status, in both time
periods, and the unobservable characteristics implies that failure to control for the
correlated unobservables overestimates the relative importance of past unionisation
experience as a determinant of future union propensity. In fact, our ndings indicate
a more prominent role for the unobserved determinants underlying union propensity
in the (1997-2002) estimates as opposed to past unionisation experience.
4.2. Observed Individual Heterogeneity (Full-Time Male Employees)
Our nal research question is assessing the e¤ect of observed characteristics on
individual unionisation propensity. We wish to identify the traits that have the
most prominent impact on the probability of union membership. Moreover, we are
interested in establishing whether using longitudinal data and controlling for the
unobserved e¤ects, unlike earlier studies such as Booth (1986) and Wright (1995),
implies that both personal and industrial characteristics a¤ect the sorting decision
of individuals into unions.
The male estimates for both periods under analysis (refer to Tables 2, 3) indi-
cate that both personal and industrial characteristics a¤ect individual propensity
towards unionisation. Thus, controlling for the unobservables and the use of longi-
tudinal data invalidate the assertion that it is mainly the industrial attributes that
impact on the union/non-union decision.
The most prominent industrial characteristic e¤ect, during the entire period un-
der consideration, stems from workforce size that appears to be positively associated
with union membership. This is in line with the notion that larger establishments
are more likely to enjoy market power and thus o¤er a greater scope for unionisa-
tion as there are more quasi-rents to be bargained over.16 However, establishment
size could be acting as a proxy for union recognition (see Disney et al, 1996).
The rst period estimates (in Table 2) indicate a widespread decline in the
probability of union membership across the majority of occupations and further,
that individuals in white collar occupations display a greater degree of union aver-
sion. The second period results (see Table 3) reveal a prevalent deunionisation
tendency across all industries except the public and education sectors that do not
16Hirsch and Addison (1986) provide a comprehensive review of a number of studies establishing
this.
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seem to share the fate of the former stronghold of trade unions, namely, the British
manufacturing industry.
The estimates are consistent with insider-outsider theories (see Lindbeck and
Snower, 1986; Blachower et al, 1990) suggesting that highly qualied employees
are less likely to rely on unions in order to extract concessions from employers. It
is also plausible that the consequent standardisation of wages within the unionised
sector, resulting in reduced human capital premia, impacts negatively on the union
propensity of highly qualied employees (see Abowd and Farber, 1982).
Highly skilled individuals within the heavily unionised public and education
sectors are, however, found to be more prone to unions with regard to the entire
period under analysis. This occurs in that the public and education sectors in the
UK still remain relatively heavily unionised and further, they are associated with
comparatively greater proportions of highly skilled employees.17 It is plausible that
given the high percentage of employees that are union members in the aforemen-
tioned sectors, that non-union members are the most marginalised employees in the
sector (see Blanchower and Bryson, 2007, p.1).
4.3. Observed Individual Heterogeneity (Female Employees)
We anticipate that male and female employees have di¤erent propensities to-
wards unionisation. On one hand, the theoretical prediction is that females will
have a lower propensity to unionise due to their discontinuous labour market par-
ticipation. On the other hand, provided that female labour market participants
receive, on average, lower wages for discriminatory reasons it is likely that they are
more prone towards unions (see, for example, Heywood, 1990).
Concerning the observed individual characteristics impact on the probability
of unionisation, as with the male estimates, the results (provided in Tables 4, 5)
suggest that individual propensity towards unionisation is determined by both in-
dustrial and personal characteristics.
Out of the industrial attributes the most pronounced impact on the probability
of union membership comes from establishment size and it is found to be positively
related with union propensity. As with the male estimates, this invalidates the
institutionalist view that large establishments act as if they were unionised and
subsequently o¤er higher wages in order to avoid unionisation.18
Married females appear to be more likely to be union members- an outcome
that is consistent with the "exit-voice" scenario suggesting that individuals with
family obligations might seek greater job security through unionisation (see Booth,
1986, pp.46-47). Moreover, this could be the result of the active trade union policies
tailored to the needs of the female portion of the labour force in an e¤ort to attract
more female members in an era of declining male union membership (see Budd and
Mumford, 2004). Further, the estimates suggest that part-time employees have a
lower probability to be union members possibly owing to their discontinuous labour
market participation. It is plausible that costs of union membership might surpass
the potential benets for this group.
17The data reveal that the male union membership percentages in the "Public Administration,
Education, Other" industrial classication were (59.91, 57.97) during (1991-1996) and (1997-
2002) respectively. The corresponding gures for females are (45.85, 49.03) and, as with the
male membership rates, they are well above the average union membership rates in the respective
samples.
18This would reverse the positive association between union membership and the size of estab-
lishment (see Brown and Medo¤, 1989).
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Highly qualied females are found to have a lower unionisation propensity thus,
validating Abowd and Farbers (1982) prediction. On the other hand, as with their
male counterparts, highly skilled females in the public and education sectors are
more likely to be union members. This is consistent with our expectation that high
degrees of human capital within the heavily unionised public and education sectors
are positively related to unionisation propensity.
Finally, given the observed increase in the female union membership rate, the
estimated results display no tendency of prevailing deunionisation across any occu-
pation contrary to the male estimates.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study the determinants of trade union membership in the UK
during 1991-2003. The use of longitudinal data allows us to ascertain whether
individual union membership at any point of time is a persistent phenomenon or
instead a random process. By employing three alternative methodologies to control
for the problem of initial conditions the results suggest that trade union membership
is quite persistent even after controlling for the unobserved e¤ect.
There is evidence, however, of a considerable correlation between the unob-
served individual heterogeneity and the initial condition and failure to control for
this overstates the degree of state dependence of union membership substantially.
Failure to control for the correlated unobservables overestimates the relative impact
of past unionisation experience as a determinant of future union propensity. This
highlights the inappropriateness of the pooled Probit estimator that assumes away
any correlation among the successive disturbances.
Heckmans (1981b) estimator is our preferred solution to the initial conditions
problem since it incorporates pre-sample information and thus produces a superior
log-likelihood to Wooldidges (2005) estimator extended by a standard Probit esti-
mator for the rst period to enable comparability. The comparative advantage of
Wooldridges (2005) estimator, however, lies in its computational simplicity. Ormes
(2001) methodology restriction that the correlation between the initial condition
and the random e¤ect is su¢ ciently low was rejected by the data and this provides
inconsistent parameter estimates.
The extent of state dependence in union membership status is notably higher
in the (1991-1996) period estimates as opposed to the (1997-2002) estimates: an
outcome that implies that the probability of remaining a union member, during
the entire period under analysis, in the U.K has declined. This is in line with our
expectations following the introduction of the successive (1980, 1982, 1988, 1990)
Employment Acts and the consequent reduction in UK trade union bargaining
strength.
Further, the degree of state dependence in male union membership appears to
be more pronounced than the respective female dependence in both time periods
under consideration. This is not surprising since the male samples employed in
this study consist of full-time employees only and moreover, male labour market
participation is not as discontinuous as it is for female employees.
We conclude that during the second period under analysis the role of habit
persistence (i.e. the behavioural e¤ect of remaining in unions due to experienc-
ing unionisation in the past) has diminished relative to the impact of unobserved
heterogeneity in moulding individual propensity towards unions.
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Hence, unobserved individual heterogeneity plays a critical role in modelling
union membership status and failing to control for this gives biased estimates.
Arulampalam and Booth (2000) make a similar statement and note that this is, of
course, nothing new. It is consistent with social custom union theories that propose
a plethora of union membership determinants such as commitment to unions and
solidarity which are generally not observed by the econometrician (see Arulampalam
and Booth, 2000, p.290 and p.308).
However, this is also consistent with the paucity of employer characteristics in
our estimations. It should be restated that while employer attributes are captured
through the industrial classication and establishment size controls these do not
su¢ ce so as to assign any specic e¤ects purely to unobserved heterogeneity (see
Vella and Verbeek 1998; Arulampalam and Booth, 2000).
In all respects it is plausible, that given the diminishing importance of trade
unions in British industrial relations, those individuals remaining in unions during
the second period do so due to factors such as personal or political beliefs which
we fail to control for.
The observed heterogeneity estimates suggest that an individuals propensity
to unionise is determined by a mixture of industrial and personal characteristics
that have a di¤erential impact on male and female propensities. This is at odds
with earlier studies, such us Booth (1986) and Wright (1995), generally employing
cross-sectional data (hence failing to control for unobservable individual specic
e¤ects) and suggesting that it is mainly the industrial characteristics that typically
have a signicant impact on the propensity to unionise.
Establishment size enters all of the estimated models with the most prominent
observed heterogeneity e¤ect, other than lagged trade union status, and is positively
associated with union membership. This is in line with the notion that larger
establishments are more likely to enjoy market power and hence o¤er a greater scope
for unionisation since there are more quasi-rents to be bargained over. However,
establishment size could be acting as a proxy for union recognition (see Disney et
al, 1996).
Concerning the (1991-1996) male union membership estimates it is evident that
there is a widespread decline in the probability of union membership across the
majority of occupations and it appears that employees in white collar occupations
display a greater degree of union aversion. This is consistent with insider-outsider
theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986) indicating that highly skilled individuals
would be less prone to rely on unions in order to extract concessions from employers
as they cannot be rapidly nor costlessly replaced. Furthermore, this outcome is in
line with the notion that highly qualied employees might be less likely to seek union
membership in that the consequent standardisation of wages results in reduced
human capital premia (see Abowd and Farber, 1982).
On the other hand, highly skilled male employees in the heavily unionised pub-
lic and education sectors are more likely to be union members. This result is
reinforced by the respective (1997-2002) estimates that further reveal that the pub-
lic sector does not seem to share the fate of the British manufacturing industry
in terms of rapid deunionisation. Therefore, while concerning the private sector
educational attainment appears to be negatively associated with individual unioni-
sation propensity, this association becomes positive with respect to the public and
education sectors. Given the combination of a greater proportion of highly qualied
individuals and the high percentage of union members in the public and education
sectors, it is plausible that non-union members are the most marginalised in the
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sector (see Blanchower and Bryson, 2007, p.1).
There is evidence that married females are more prone to unions and this is
consistent with the notion that individuals with family responsibilities might seek
greater job security through unionisation (see Booth, 1986, pp.46-47). Moreover,
this outcome could stem from the active union policies designed to attract more
female members in an era of declining male union membership (see Budd and
Mumford, 2004). Furthermore, part-time female employees appear less likely to be
in unions possibly due to their discontinuous participation in the labour market.
Highly qualied females seem to be less likely to be union members- an out-
come that veries Abowd and Farbers (1982) model prediction. However, as with
the male estimates, highly skilled females within the public and education sectors
have a higher propensity towards unionisation according to the observed hetero-
geneity estimates for both periods. This reects the high representation of women
in both the teaching profession and public administration which still remain two of
the most heavily unionised industries in the UK. Finally, given the increasing fe-
male unionisation rates throughout the period under analysis, the female estimates
show no evidence of prevalent deunionisation across any occupation unlike the male
estimates.
Future work could entail looking at the individual responses from the two al-
ternative membership questions and the union coverage outcomes in the BHPS in
order to detect any potential measurement error and its impact on the estimates
of union membership determinants. Further, another interesting extension is eval-
uating the sensitivity of the Heckman and Wooldridge estimators to the normality
assumption on the unobserved individual e¤ects by employing a discrete mass point
distribution to model the unobserved heterogeneity (see Stewart, 2007).
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Appendix
                                                                                               TABLE 1
               Descriptive Statistics
1991-1996 1997-2002
Gender Male Female Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Trade Union Membership 0.4099 0.492 0.3173 0.465 0.3471 0.476 0.3474 0.476
Log (1+Potential Experience) 3.223 0.634 3.166 0.715 3.558 0.456 3.544 0.467
Marital Status 0.692 0.462 0.683 0.465 0.665 0.472 0.642 0.479
Full-Time Employment _ _ 0.672 0.469 _ _ 0.709 0.454
Maternity Leave _ _ 0.011 0.104 _ _ 0.013 0.113
Black (Caribbean, African, Other) 0.001 0.035 0.005 0.068 0.002 0.047 0.006 0.079
Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.014 0.116 0.008 0.090 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.111
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.009 0.093 0.005 0.068 0.007 0.080 0.005 0.072
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.300 0.458 0.300 0.458 0.269 0.444 0.282 0.450
South West 0.097 0.296 0.070 0.255 0.094 0.291 0.095 0.293
Midlands 0.167 0.373 0.158 0.365 0.192 0.394 0.172 0.377
Scotland 0.078 0.269 0.097 0.296 0.078 0.268 0.089 0.285
Wales 0.053 0.224 0.047 0.211 0.056 0.230 0.050 0.219
North West 0.110 0.313 0.112 0.316 0.102 0.303 0.111 0.315
North East 0.150 0.358 0.175 0.380 0.170 0.376 0.160 0.366
East Anglia 0.044 0.205 0.041 0.198 0.040 0.195 0.041 0.198
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(University/Higher Qual) 0.061 0.240 0.079 0.270 0.052 0.222 0.101 0.301
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Vocational Qualification) 0.034 0.182 0.052 0.222 0.024 0.152 0.052 0.221
University Degree or Higher 0.158 0.365 0.109 0.312 0.169 0.375 0.133 0.340
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.082 0.274 0.074 0.263 0.087 0.281 0.078 0.268
A Levels 0.239 0.426 0.155 0.362 0.267 0.442 0.225 0.418
O Levels or CSE 0.333 0.471 0.426 0.495 0.345 0.475 0.409 0.492
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.157 0.364 0.199 0.399 0.181 0.385 0.206 0.404
Workforce >500 0.213 0.410 0.156 0.363 0.206 0.405 0.173 0.379
Workforce 100-499 0.303 0.460 0.228 0.419 0.297 0.457 0.213 0.409
Workforce 25-99 0.271 0.445 0.275 0.447 0.248 0.432 0.271 0.445
Workforce <25 0.213 0.409 0.340 0.474 0.249 0.432 0.343 0.475
 Industrial Classification Dummies
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 0.016 0.125 0.006 0.080 0.006 0.078 0.005 0.067
Energy and Water Supplies 0.051 0.220 0.007 0.085 0.025 0.155 0.007 0.083
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals 0.052 0.221 0.018 0.134 0.053 0.225 0.014 0.116
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries 0.156 0.363 0.050 0.219 0.138 0.345 0.030 0.171
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.122 0.328 0.067 0.250 0.151 0.359 0.062 0.241
Construction 0.044 0.204 0.006 0.076 0.055 0.227 0.006 0.079
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) 0.116 0.320 0.177 0.382 0.122 0.327 0.185 0.388
Transport & Communication 0.091 0.288 0.030 0.171 0.105 0.307 0.036 0.187
Banking & Finance 0.134 0.341 0.153 0.360 0.143 0.350 0.154 0.361
Public Administration, Education, Other Services 0.219 0.414 0.484 0.500 0.202 0.401 0.502 0.500
Occupational Classification Dummies
Professional Occupations 0.124 0.330 0.107 0.310 0.098 0.297 0.106 0.308
Managers & Administrators 0.180 0.384 0.097 0.296 0.196 0.397 0.120 0.325
Associate Professional & Technical 0.108 0.311 0.124 0.329 0.110 0.312 0.141 0.349
Clerical & Secretarial 0.099 0.298 0.333 0.471 0.081 0.273 0.302 0.459
Craft & related 0.182 0.386 0.026 0.161 0.202 0.401 0.021 0.143
Personal & Protective Service 0.069 0.253 0.117 0.322 0.059 0.235 0.131 0.338
Sales 0.033 0.179 0.076 0.266 0.035 0.183 0.090 0.287
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.152 0.359 0.037 0.188 0.158 0.365 0.030 0.170
Other Occupations 0.054 0.227 0.081 0.273 0.063 0.243 0.059 0.235
Number of Observations 4818 5172 5538 5760
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
23
TABLE 2
 Dynamic Random Effects Probit Models of Union Membership (1991-1996), Males
Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 2.562 43.04 1.731 10.38 1.331 10.33
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 2.164 8.46
Log(1+Potential Experience) 0.117 1.85 0.349 2.80 0.068 0.61
Marital Status 0.039 0.20 -0.047 -0.21 -0.046 -0.20
Mean(Marital Status) 0.060 0.29 0.289 1.11 0.238 0.89
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) -0.096 -0.37 0.161 0.36 -0.516 -1.11
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.431 0.63 0.169 0.19 -0.266 -0.23
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.119 0.37 0.369 0.68 -0.040 -0.07
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.094 -1.06 -0.203 -1.35 -0.203 -1.28
South West -0.146 -1.26 -0.351 -1.75 -0.183 -0.90
Scotland -0.269 -2.03 -0.439 -1.97 -0.366 -1.58
Wales 0.171 1.17 0.362 1.49 0.407 1.56
North West 0.095 0.87 0.291 1.51 0.053 0.28
North East -0.071 -0.70 -0.015 -0.09 -0.221 -1.22
East Anglia -0.183 -1.16 -0.284 -1.07 -0.253 -0.91
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Univ/Higher Qual) 0.604 3.86 1.133 4.26 0.727 2.85
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Voc Qualification) 0.584 2.85 0.940 2.83 0.882 2.48
University Degree or Higher -0.079 -0.51 -0.142 -0.58 -0.088 -0.34
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.083 0.50 0.237 0.86 0.146 0.50
A Levels 0.057 0.58 0.180 1.10 0.119 0.69
O Levels or CSE 0.086 0.99 0.178 1.23 0.170 1.12
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.143 1.29 0.153 1.20 0.156 1.15
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) -0.264 -1.60 -0.306 -1.28 -0.281 -1.11
Workforce >500 0.441 4.69 0.673 5.22 0.545 3.93
Workforce 100-499 0.377 4.36 0.507 4.42 0.413 3.24
Workforce 25-99 0.215 2.41 0.252 2.19 0.208 1.63
Professional Occupations -0.560 -3.36 -0.831 -3.37 -0.777 -2.90
Managers & Administrators -0.648 -4.24 -1.028 -4.31 -0.817 -3.30
Associate Professional & Technical -0.446 -2.74 -0.747 -3.06 -0.526 -2.02
Clerical & Secretarial -0.307 -1.94 -0.553 -2.37 -0.387 -1.55
Craft & related -0.260 -1.79 -0.343 -1.65 -0.232 -1.00
Personal & Protective Service 0.028 0.17 -0.104 -0.42 0.233 0.87
Sales -0.607 -2.56 -0.894 -2.77 -0.541 -1.56
Plant & Machine Operatives -0.317 -2.15 -0.480 -2.21 -0.499 -2.11
Time Dummy 1993 _ _ _ _ -0.002 -0.01
Time Dummy 1994 -0.035 -0.45 -0.047 -0.53 -0.037 -0.34
Time Dummy 1995 0.057 0.72 0.040 0.45 0.075 0.68
Time Dummy 1996 0.133 1.67 0.140 1.56 0.211 1.89
Constant -1.782 -6.42 -2.373 -4.89 -2.198 -4.59
ρ _ _ 0.479 4.11 0.449 7.15
θ _ _ 3.140 1.82 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.800 0.462 0.375
Predicted Probability Ratio 9.007 3.138 2.449
Log-Likelihood -1142.13 -1524.70 -1066.65
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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TABLE 3
Dynamic Random  Effects Probit Models of Union Membership (1997-2002), Males
Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 2.412 42.41 0.697 4.47 0.569 4.67
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 3.680 11.50
Log(1+Potential Experience) 0.017 0.24 0.033 0.10 0.044 0.25
Marital Status 0.038 0.20 0.263 0.95 0.263 0.97
Mean(Marital Status) -0.053 -0.27 -0.036 -0.09 -0.245 -0.77
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) 0.436 1.68 1.289 1.97 1.104 1.77
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.058 0.11 1.197 1.52 -0.934 -0.59
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.123 -0.37 -1.612 -2.47 -1.481 -1.39
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.130 -1.54 -0.221 -0.88 -0.326 -1.50
South West 0.077 0.71 0.384 0.83 0.368 1.32
Scotland 0.062 0.51 0.512 1.73 0.151 0.49
Wales 0.345 2.63 1.633 4.60 0.732 2.24
North West 0.205 1.95 1.636 3.25 0.295 1.09
North East -0.009 -0.10 0.525 1.64 -0.041 -0.18
East Anglia 0.034 0.24 0.718 1.84 0.061 0.17
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Univ/Higher Qual) 0.403 2.35 0.798 2.13 0.319 0.84
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Voc Qualification) 0.223 1.03 1.645 3.12 0.472 0.96
University Degree or Higher -0.448 -3.30 -1.175 -2.69 -0.617 -1.88
HND, HNC, Teaching -0.381 -2.65 -1.644 -3.52 -0.817 -2.27
A Levels -0.010 -0.10 -0.021 -0.05 0.168 0.69
O Levels or CSE 0.000 0.00 -0.069 -0.19 0.204 0.88
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health -0.102 -1.03 -0.135 -0.99 -0.154 -1.13
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) 0.009 0.06 -0.347 -1.02 0.123 0.39
Workforce >500 0.604 6.76 1.168 6.26 0.902 5.37
Workforce 100-499 0.615 7.37 1.169 6.06 0.974 6.17
Workforce 25-99 0.356 4.05 0.641 3.67 0.548 3.46
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -1.187 -2.30 -2.613 -1.97 -2.580 -2.20
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.796 -3.70 -1.481 -2.83 -1.303 -3.16
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.941 -4.73 -1.157 -3.26 -1.086 -2.85
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.826 -4.21 -1.157 -3.31 -1.189 -3.21
Construction -0.876 -3.97 -1.276 -3.29 -1.104 -2.67
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -1.122 -5.34 -1.767 -4.73 -1.500 -3.72
Transport & Communication -0.475 -2.37 -0.645 -1.66 -0.770 -1.97
Banking & Finance -0.837 -4.23 -1.343 -3.67 -1.129 -2.85
Public Administration, Education, Other -0.351 -1.79 -0.199 -0.53 -0.280 -0.72
Time Dummy 1999 _ _ _ _ -0.359 -3.03
Time Dummy 2000 0.031 0.41 0.002 0.02 -0.178 -1.51
Time Dummy 2001 -0.031 -0.40 -0.031 -0.29 -0.202 -1.70
Time Dummy 2002 0.112 1.41 0.230 1.95 0.056 0.45
Constant -1.102 -3.17 -1.615 -1.12 -2.149 -2.60
ρ _ _ 0.865 26.76 0.672 16.72
θ _ _ 1.164 6.03 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.767 0.095 0.089
Predicted Probability Ratio 9.737 1.310 1.592
Log-Likelihood -1258.97 -1595.28 -1078.95
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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TABLE 4
Dynamic Random Effects Probit Models of Union Membership (1991-1996), Females
Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 2.095 37.92 1.083 10.15 0.909 9.01
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 2.072 10.70
Log(1+Potential Experience) 0.082 1.67 0.132 1.25 0.095 0.98
Marital Status -0.115 -0.75 -0.120 -0.65 -0.157 -0.83
Mean(Marital Status) 0.352 2.09 0.621 2.57 0.589 2.50
Full-Time Employment 0.037 0.30 0.109 0.72 0.138 0.90
Mean(Full-Time Employment) 0.261 1.80 0.755 3.28 0.297 1.39
Maternity Leave 0.026 0.10 -0.049 -0.17 -0.074 -0.25
Mean(Maternity Leave) 0.857 1.34 2.765 2.05 1.638 1.35
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) 0.317 1.03 0.682 0.97 0.554 0.87
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.010 -0.03 0.447 0.57 -0.496 -0.72
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.171 -0.42 -0.483 -0.51 -0.690 -0.75
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.148 -1.75 -0.337 -1.86 -0.117 -0.70
South West -0.071 -0.57 -0.188 -0.68 -0.055 -0.22
Scotland 0.215 2.03 0.524 2.22 0.397 1.85
Wales 0.258 1.98 0.641 2.17 0.395 1.48
North West 0.012 0.12 0.090 0.40 -0.098 -0.47
North East 0.254 2.86 0.608 3.03 0.384 2.12
East Anglia -0.079 -0.51 -0.347 -1.00 0.046 0.15
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Univ/Higher Qual) 0.809 3.91 1.369 3.87 0.840 2.45
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Voc Qualification) 1.207 4.04 2.147 4.29 1.641 3.37
University Degree or Higher -0.407 -1.96 -0.315 -0.83 -0.298 -0.82
HND, HNC, Teaching -0.621 -2.20 -0.773 -1.60 -0.671 -1.43
A Levels 0.141 1.42 0.434 2.05 0.282 1.45
O Levels or CSE 0.089 1.18 0.252 1.54 0.147 0.98
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.121 1.39 0.129 1.24 0.122 1.15
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) -0.253 -1.89 -0.357 -1.42 -0.247 -1.07
Workforce >500 0.340 4.23 0.534 4.02 0.402 3.02
Workforce 100-499 0.247 3.31 0.335 2.73 0.291 2.36
Workforce 25-99 0.183 2.62 0.209 1.91 0.139 1.26
Professional Occupations -0.119 -0.80 -0.293 -1.07 -0.435 -1.62
Managers & Administrators -0.359 -2.60 -0.599 -2.42 -0.556 -2.30
Associate Professional & Technical -0.021 -0.16 0.046 0.19 -0.052 -0.22
Clerical & Secretarial -0.212 -1.92 -0.434 -2.01 -0.322 -1.56
Craft & related -0.006 -0.04 0.112 0.32 0.044 0.13
Personal & Protective Service -0.028 -0.23 -0.028 -0.13 0.064 0.29
Sales -0.356 -2.49 -0.679 -2.57 -0.430 -1.68
Plant & Machine Operatives -0.297 -1.74 -0.369 -1.16 -0.327 -1.06
Time Dummy 1993 _ _ _ _ 0.166 1.66
Time Dummy 1994 -0.109 -1.50 -0.127 -1.46 -0.024 -0.24
Time Dummy 1995 0.085 1.18 0.113 1.30 0.216 2.11
Time Dummy 1996 0.257 3.59 0.401 4.47 0.532 5.06
Constant -2.086 -9.33 -3.080 -6.33 -3.160 -7.04
ρ _ _ 0.625 13.05 0.527 11.60
θ _ _ 1.098 6.54 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.704 0.247 0.244
Predicted Probability Ratio 6.407 1.964 1.712
Log-Likelihood -1446.08 -1758.06 -1331.85
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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TABLE 5
 Dynamic Random Effects Probit Models of Union Membership (1997-2002), Females
Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 1.995 38.46 0.235 2.26 0.298 2.92
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 3.303 12.95
Log(1+Potential Experience) -0.015 -0.26 -0.176 -0.73 0.005 0.03
Marital Status -0.010 -0.06 0.193 0.86 0.212 0.95
Mean(Marital Status) 0.257 1.50 0.710 2.15 0.441 1.55
Full-Time Employment -0.067 -0.61 -0.022 -0.15 0.012 0.09
Mean(Full-Time Employment) 0.288 2.23 1.074 3.40 0.400 1.59
Maternity Leave -0.025 -0.11 -0.148 -0.48 -0.131 -0.42
Mean(Maternity Leave) 0.226 0.41 1.689 1.04 0.854 0.54
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) 0.059 0.28 0.233 0.47 -0.112 -0.16
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.843 2.04 4.272 2.92 1.973 1.50
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.536 1.69 1.899 2.52 1.496 1.56
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.211 -2.83 -0.989 -3.83 -0.422 -1.89
South West -0.148 -1.50 -0.532 -1.66 -0.449 -1.54
Scotland 0.168 1.75 0.498 1.52 0.426 1.48
Wales 0.322 2.70 1.303 2.96 0.728 2.02
North West 0.015 0.17 -0.322 -0.83 0.038 0.14
North East 0.128 1.57 0.353 1.34 0.365 1.54
East Anglia -0.280 -2.03 -1.090 -2.26 -0.751 -1.85
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Univ/Higher Qual) 1.110 6.00 3.006 5.96 2.324 4.98
(Public Admin/Educ/Other)*(Voc Qualification) 0.472 2.50 1.005 1.44 0.476 1.03
University Degree or Higher -0.565 -3.02 -1.059 -2.14 -0.976 -1.98
HND, HNC, Teaching -0.107 -0.63 0.249 0.30 0.602 1.32
A Levels 0.127 1.46 0.682 2.43 0.579 2.24
O Levels or CSE 0.089 1.15 0.247 1.01 0.370 1.60
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.017 0.21 -0.042 -0.38 -0.126 -1.13
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) -0.079 -0.65 -0.267 -0.64 0.039 0.13
Workforce >500 0.430 6.01 0.781 4.67 0.705 4.70
Workforce 100-499 0.251 3.73 0.649 4.38 0.555 4.02
Workforce 25-99 0.187 2.96 0.297 2.32 0.221 1.79
Professional Occupations 0.080 0.58 0.307 1.10 0.119 0.42
Managers & Administrators -0.312 -2.49 -0.266 -1.03 -0.305 -1.16
Associate Professional & Technical -0.001 -0.01 0.176 0.70 0.115 0.45
Clerical & Secretarial -0.181 -1.67 -0.023 -0.09 -0.154 -0.63
Craft & related -0.137 -0.70 -0.109 -0.27 -0.146 -0.35
Personal & Protective Service -0.069 -0.59 0.178 0.68 0.154 0.59
Sales -0.308 -2.39 -0.421 -1.49 -0.304 -1.09
Plant & Machine Operatives -0.236 -1.39 0.007 0.02 -0.204 -0.57
Time Dummy 1999 _ _ _ _ -0.672 -6.30
Time Dummy 2000 0.360 5.56 0.550 5.98 0.230 2.22
Time Dummy 2001 -0.302 -4.45 -0.142 -1.53 -0.494 -4.58
Time Dummy 2002 0.387 5.94 0.701 7.31 0.380 3.60
Constant -1.638 -6.35 -2.767 -2.62 -3.275 -4.27
ρ _ _ 0.853 42.57 0.744 27.09
θ _ _ 0.729 8.19 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.672 0.036 0.047
Predicted Probability Ratio 4.157 1.080 1.214
Log-Likelihood -1766.94 -1980.20 -1485.09
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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